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ABSTRACT: This paper presents two software tools for analyzing safety risks, SBOAT (Stochastic BPMN
Optimisation and Analysis Tool) and SBM (SafetyBarrierManagerr). SBOAT employs principles from
stochastic model checking to allow for the quantitative verification of workflows. SBM supports the creation of
valid safety-barrier diagrams and allows the quantitative analysis of the probability of all possible end states of
the barrier diagram, i.e. the outcomes if one or several of the barriers fail to perform their barrier function. We
compare the foundations of these tools and describe how they can be used and how they complement each other
by means of the analysis of a production workflow inspired by a real-world industry case.
1 INTRODUCTION
Ensuring the safe execution of workflows is essential
in production operations. Even simple workflows may
be embedded in larger networks of processes leading
to complex aggregate systems. A range of tools have
been developed that allow for automated quantitative
analysis of workflows which seek to assist in building
safer and more cost-effective systems.
Ensuring safety in such systems frequently involves
the addition of control points, where safety properties
are verified at key points in the process. Determining
the ideal location of such control points at design time
leads to safer and cost-effective systems. It may not
always be possible to determine the points in a pro-
cess where failure may occur, so to archive an accept-
able level of risk controls are commonly implemented
at key stages to identify faults in the preceding sub-
process. Determining the optimal placement of con-
trol points (safety barriers) must balance a number of
factors; including the mean time after a failure has oc-
curred until it is detected, the resources that have been
consumed/wasted when failure is likely to be detec-
ted and the placement of control points to ensure that
a fault does not pass undetected. In this context an
appropriate and not too resource demanding risk ana-
lysis is essential in building large scale systems.
This paper presents a production workflow in-
spired by an industry case and compares and ex-
plores the combination of the application of two soft-
ware tools for analysing risks; SBOAT (Stochastic
BPMN Optimisation and Analysis Tool) and SBM
(SafetyBarrierManagerr).
SBOAT allows a user to model processes using an
extended form of the Business Process Model and
Notation (BPMN) (Object Management Group 2011)
language which allows for the incorporation of re-
source modelling and stochastic behaviour. This tool
is based on the mathematical foundation of stochastic
process calculi and appropriate model checking tech-
niques and is designed to be easy to use by busi-
ness practitioners. In practical terms, using SBOAT
a business practitioner can model production work-
flows using familiar notation and include quantitative
data such as time or cost and then automatically de-
termine the probabilities of various behaviours, freely
defined using formal temporal logic and incorporating
specific states of the qualitative properties.
SBM is likewise a tool developed for risk ana-
lysis of processes, SBM supports the creation of valid
safety-barrier diagrams (Duijm 2009) and allows for
the quantitative analysis of the probability of all pos-
sible end states of the barrier diagram, i.e. the out-
comes if one or several of the barriers fail to perform
their barrier function. As input the tool requires sys-
tem models with specified barrier locations and out-
puts risk matrices which assess the tolerability of pos-
sible outcomes.
1.1 Safety analysis tools
The key benefits of safety assessment tools are that
they create awareness about risk and safety concerns
and can help identify potential hazards. Without this
it would not be possible to determine where precau-
tionary measures should be incorporated in a process.
Many risk assessment tools and methodologies
have been developed in recent years in order to help
and assist enterprises and organisations assess their
health and safety risks. What method or tool is best
suited for a given organisation depends on several
factors, including workplace conditions, for example
the number of employees, the complexity of tasks, the
work activities and workplace equipment, the phys-
ical set-up/location for the work activity and several
other factors.
The most common risk assessment tools are check-
lists, which are a useful tool to help identify potential
risks (The European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work 2015). Other type of risk assessment tools in-
clude: guides, guidance documents, handbooks, bro-
chures, questionnaires, and software tools. Some tools
are generic while others have been developed with
a specific industry or even a specific branch/risk in
mind.
The two tools this paper focus on, SBOAT and
SafetyBarrierManagerr, are both generic tools inten-
ded to help enterprises identify risks and take precau-
tionary measures to the extent deemed necessary and
viable for the given enterprise.
2 STOCHASTIC BPMN OPTIMISATION AND
ANALYSIS TOOL (SBOAT)
2.1 Tool Description
Workflow management as a discipline has tradition-
ally suffered from a proliferation of process defini-
tion languages based on similar, but subtly different,
concepts and constructs. After numerous attempts,
standardization efforts have converged towards the
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) lan-
guage (Object Management Group 2011), which is
intended for modelling business processes primarily
during the analysis and design phases. BPMN has
emerged as a standard notation for capturing business
processes, especially at the level of domain analysis
and high-level systems design.
SBOAT is the Stochastic BPMN Optimisation and
Analysis Tool, which allows a user to model, and an-
notate with rewards and stochastic branching, a busi-
ness processes as a BPMN Business Process Diagram
(BPD). The tool is based on solid mathematical prin-
ciples and is designed to be easy to use through a
graphical interface, see fig. 1, which allows for edit-
ing or importing BPMN models with minimal addi-
tional training compared to a standard BPMN model-
ling tool.
Figure 1: SBOAT version 0.45 Overall User Interface (enlarged)
Using SBOAT a business practitioner can model
production workflows with details like time cost and
other constraints such as limits of available resources.
Verification of properties of interest of the system
can be performed and are calculated for all possible
execution paths of the system. In this manner it is
possible for a company to experiment with different
types of workflows to find the one which maximises
throughput while maximising safety parameters (Her-
bert & Sharp 2014).
The capabilities of the SBOAT tool also allow for
the generation of fault trees which produce include
failure probabilities which allow for the underlying
stochastic elements of a workflow and determine re-
source consumption at points of failure (Herbert &
Sharp 2013b). In addition SBOAT allows for schedul-
ing analysis and resource analysis (Herbert & Sharp
2012). Optimisation can also be achieved with regard
to properties described using a rich specification lan-
guage. In this case SBOAT searches for possible im-
proved restructurings of a workflow, by means of an
evolutionary algorithm (Herbert & Sharp 2013a).
2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings
SBOAT employs principles from stochastic model
checking (Baier & Katoen 2008) to allow for the auto-
mated analysis of workflows. The workflow is conver-
ted to an algebraic description for which a statespace,
describing all possible system the workflow may as-
sume, is generated. This approach differs from simu-
lation in that all possible states are examined which
may not be the case after any finite amount of simula-
tion.
Analysis in SBOAT is based on efficiently check-
ing each state in the statespace against a temporal lo-
gic (Baier & Katoen 2008) formulae expressing prop-
erties of interest. These are encoded in Probabilistic
Computation Tree logic (PCTL) allowing determina-
tion of probabilities of specific execution paths. For
example, given a model M the expression:
M : Pr=?[F(temp> 10◦∧ t< 100s)U(valveA = true)]
would identify the probability (Pr), during execution,
of arriving in a state where a temperature quantity ex-
ceeds 10◦ in less than the first 100 seconds of execu-
tion followed by a specific valve A being opened.
In general the following operators, further de-
scribed in (Herbert & Sharp 2014), may be used to
build analysis queries:
• Xa The next operator is a unary operator that spe-
cifies for a path that a given property a holds in
the path’s next state.
• aUb The binary until operator specifies that, for a
given path, in some state of the path, the property
b is true and in all preceding states the property
a is true.
• Fa The unary eventually operator specifies that,
for a given path, a eventually becomes true at
some point along the path.
• Ga The unary always operator specifies that, for
a given path, a is true in all states along the path.
The overall software structure of SBOAT shown in
fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Architecture of the SBOAT tool and environment.
Using SBOAT involves constructing an annotated
Core BPMN model, defining the analysis one wishes
to perform and then running the analysis. It may be
desirable to set a number of analysis optimisation set-
tings first if one expects the analysis to be particularly
complex and it is also possible to distribute checking
across multiple compute resources.
The framework’s modelling language includes the
tracking of freely defined real-valued quantities as-
sociated with the process (such as time, cost, and
temperature). In addition, this formalism also allows
for an intention preserving stochastic semantics able
to model both probabilistic- and non-deterministic
branching behaviour. These may be combined such
that a systems make make a non-deterministic choice
where each decision then has different probabilistic
outcomes. In SBOAT we further extend this formal-
ism to allow for the introduction of error states which
allow for both fail-stop behaviour and continued sys-
tem execution (Herbert & Sharp 2014).
Stochastic model checking allows one to efficiently
explore the entire state space of a workflow. The
checking algorithm allows for the weighted genera-
tion of PCTL queries that can be used to express a
desired balance between the occurrence of errors and
data quantities associated with the workflow. It should
be noted here that the algorithm performs exhaust-
ive generation of all possible states, including error
states, that could arise during execution and therefore
our method can determine the probability of complex
events, such as combined faults, while accounting for
the basic probabilistic structure of the system being
modelled. Combined this allows for the expression of
queries which identify the factors in operations which
have the largest impact on the state being reach; for
example which step in the production workflow con-
tributes the largest safety risk and may be the point at
which an additional control should be implemented.
In SBOAT these queries along with a model of
an existing workflow are used as inputs to an evol-
utionary algorithm which iteratively, through a pro-
cess of mutation and cross-over, generates candidate
improved workflows (Herbert & Sharp 2013a). The
stochastic model checking of a weighted set of quer-
ies is used as a fitness function for determining the de-
gree of improvement of candidate workflows. Being
an evolutionary algorithm, when a candidate work-
flow shows improvement it is used as the basis for the
next round of mutation and cross-over. Further, we
allow this evolutionary procedure to be constrained
such that candidates can also be eliminated based
on constraint requirements also expressed in PTCL
(these would typically encode fundamental proper-
ties of the workflow such as actions that must be per-
formed prior to other actions or safety constraints that
no acceptable workflow will be allowed to violate).
Further, the constraints allow the removal of evolu-
tionary dead-ends at an early stage, a necessary step
to achieving acceptable performance in a practical im-
plementation of this algorithm.
3 SAFETY BARRIER MANAGER (SBM)
3.1 Tool Description
SBM supports the creation of valid safety-barrier dia-
grams and it allows the quantitative analysis of the
probability of all possible end states of the barrier dia-
gram, i.e. the outcomes if one or several of the bar-
riers fail to perform their barrier function. The tool
provides a graphical interface for drawing the ele-
ments of the diagram (safety barriers, events or condi-
tions and other logical operators, such as logical gates
and event tree branches). Safety barriers may consist
of sub-elements that can be shared between several
barriers, and that thus represent dependency between
barriers.
Quantification of the safety-barrier diagram is per-
formed by transferring the logical structure of the dia-
gram into a fault tree notation, which is then solved
using a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) algorithm.
The BDD algorithm allows the use of inverse logic
(necessary to both describe events on failure and on
success of a barrier).
Performance specifications and management re-
quirements can be added to the description of the
safety barriers to support inspection, maintenance and
life-cycle management. The tool has the option to
include the quality of management, as assessed by
means of audit and inspection, into the quantitat-
ive probability assessment using the techniques de-
veloped during the ARAMIS project (Duijm & Goos-
sens 2006) (Guldenmund, Hale, Goossens, Betten, &
Duijm 2006).
Results can be presented by means of risk matrices
in order to assess the tolerability of certain out-comes
in terms of risk.
3.2 Theoretical Underpinnings
SafetyBarrierManagerr (SBM) is a tool to describe
and analyze safety barrier diagrams (Duijm 2008),
(Duijm 2009), (Duijm 2007). A safety barrier dia-
gram is a variation of a cause consequence diagram.
These diagrams de-scribe the temporal evolution of an
accident sequence (an accident scenario) with a focus
on the actions and measures that are foreseen to: a)
prevent the deviations that cause the accident, and b)
mitigate the consequences of the accident. Such ac-
tions and measures are named “safety barriers” (see
fig. 3).
Figure 3: Safety Barrier
Safety barriers implement safety functions, where
a safety function is a function designed to abort the
development of an adverse situation.
Safety barriers are graphically presented as in Fig-
ure 1. To the left of the barrier is the condition that
triggers the barrier function (often an initiating fail-
ure condition); to the upper right the condition when
the barrier correctly deals with the situation and to the
right (i.e. “through” the barrier) the condition when
the barrier fails to perform its barrier function. From
a point of view of risk analysis, the main important
property of a safety barrier is its probability of failure
on demand (PFD). The safety strategy is to implement
several safety barriers in order to create redundancy
and minimize the probability of an accident. Com-
plicating issues that should be considered are: a) com-
mon cause failures or dependencies between barriers
that reduce the redundancy; and b) the necessity of
maintaining the PFD of all the safety barriers during
the life time of the system. This requires management
of safety barriers. Note that safety functions can be
performed by hardware, software and human action.
Safety-barrier management thus covers management
of design and maintenance of hard and software as
well as human re-source management. Safety-barrier
diagrams are developed by further analysis of causes
and consequences of hazards identified using hazard
identification techniques such as FMEA, HazOp or
HACCP. Such analysis is similar to fault tree ana-
lysis (finding sufficient and necessary conditions for
adverse events) and event tree analysis (analyzing the
possible outcomes of an adverse event). Such ana-
lyses are mainly manual desk-top exercises using de-
tailed knowledge of the system in question.
4 COMPARISON OF THE TWO TOOLS
SBM focusses on accident scenarios and does not
address the analysis of normal (successful) work-
flows. SBM does not automatically create failure
cases based on a system description, the analyst has
to identify those cases himself, and also describe the
events following the failure or success of a safety bar-
rier. However the tool is highly efficient and check
even large models quickly. The output can take the
form of industry standard risk matrices.
In contrast SBOAT can model workflows using a
standard notation which are both successful and those
which contain errors or are otherwise not optimal. The
user has to define analysis queries for the workflow,
e.g. what is a failure state, using a somewhat complex
syntax. The output takes the form of probabilities of
specific events or an optimised system which seeks to
minimise properties of interest.
The following table compares key parameters of
the two tools:
Feature SBM SBOAT
Easy of use Average Average
Precision Exact (based on
scenarios)
Exact (based on
computations)
Performance Fast Slow
Feature sets Narrow Wide
Table 1: Comparison between the two tools
As can be seen from table 1 each tool is best suited
to a particular context. In general, SBOAT is more
precise and detailed and makes it easy to directly
convert a workflow written in commonly used busi-
ness process languages like BPMN at the expense of
considerable computational requirements. However,
SBM is a faster tool which quickly gives the user an
overview of hazard workflows, without the intermedi-
ate step of detailing a normal workflow.
5 INDUSTRY APPLICABILITY
5.1 Case Description
We will use a workflow description from the food in-
dustry to illustrate the two tools. The food industry
has several safety demands; for example safe working
conditions for employees, traceability and hygiene re-
quirements to ensure the food is safe for consumption.
The example used here is from a slaughter and pro-
cessing plant for Danish chickens. Only a selection of
the process is shown here.
Figure 4 shows the processing workflow as de-
scribed the case company, meaning that in the fig-
ure it is assumed that the safety barriers hold. When
the chickens have been slaughtered and the feath-
ers removed a veterinarian checks them. If they pass
this health check the chickens continue to a scanning
which scans for “hard breast syndrome” which means
the breast meat cannot be eaten by humans as it is
too hard and thus needs to be removed and used for
pet food processing. If the scanning shows the breast
meat is ok the chicken is weighted. If it weighs over
a given limit an amount of chickens is selected to
be sold as whole chickens. The rest are processed in
selected packages with bigger portions. If this limit
is not met the chicken is processed into the selected
pieces the plant needs to fulfil its orders (for example
breast meat, drumsticks, hearts, liver, wings, minced
meat).
The entire process is automated; chickens hang on
a line like clothes hanging out to dry and get carried
around the plant as they pass through each step. The
chicken starts out hanging on the line as one whole
chicken and if the chicken is not sold as a whole
chicken it is cut into selected pieces over a number
of steps (for example one step cuts off the feet, one
the wings, one the drumsticks etc.) until the whole
chicken has been cut into smaller pieces.
Figure 5 shows an example of the many barriers
which are built into the process to try and prevent a
failure state, meaning what happens if a failure hap-
pens and is not detected. In this example it is the
checks and consequences if a chicken with illness
falsely get processed as healthy (note, this example
show only a small selected of the process and has been
simplified for illustration purposes). Here it should be
kept in mind that if one chicken is ill, the whole herd
is likely ill too and in any case the whole herd needs
to be destroyed for safety reasons. Furthermore, ill-
ness can be tied to a certain chicken farmer which
means all chickens from that farmer could be infec-
ted. This means that meat from that farmer, which can
arrive with days or weeks in between, would need to
be investigated. At the slightest doubt all meat from
that farmer within a certain timeframe determined
by veterinarians (depending on the illness in ques-
tion) will need to be destroyed. It is therefore vital
that chickens which contain illness are discovered and
destroyed as quickly and early in the process as pos-
sible to prevent huge loss (e.g. loss in terms of produc-
tion time, transport and potential loss of customers or
decreased brand value should illness be connected to
the chicken producer).
As can be seen then the later the failure is detected
the higher the risk and cost of the failure. If the meat
from an ill chicken makes it to a client and the client
gets ill the consequences are not only financial but
can also result in legal action. For this to be possible
to chicken needs to have either passed or not been se-
lected for random checks
5.2 Using Safety Barrier Manager on the case
To use SBM on the case it is necessary to re-draw the
workflow in the style of SBM, illustrating the safety
checks. The tool does not concern itself with normal
flows; only with what happens in hazard situations.
The case includes three checks for different ad-
verse situations: firstly a vet checks randomly selected
chickens from each batch (meaning from each farm
and flock that enters the plant) for infectious disease
and bacteria which, if gone unnoticed can result in ill-
ness in humans of a more or less severe degree, chick-
ens with “hard breasts”, and chickens too small to be
sold as whole chickens. This can be represented by 3
barriers. The success is the proper action to re-move
the chicken for further processing, while the “failure”
of the barrier is the processing of unsuitable chickens,
see fig. 6.
Figure 6: SBM diagram of the chicken process safety functions.
Using SBM on the case gives the user a quick over-
view of the safety precautions they currently have
in case. The output can be used as input for de-
bate regarding the adequacy of the current process
and whether any of these safety functions can be im-
proved. However, there is some work required to in-
Figure 4: Normal workflow in a chicken processing plant.
put the workflow as SBM needs the user to draw
the workflow using safety barriers and not commonly
used workflow description tools.
5.3 Using SBOAT on the case
To use SBOAT we first model the process in the tool,
annotating it with rewards and constraints as shown
in fig. 7. These include resource usage, for example
the time it takes for each processing step to complete,
and decision outcome probabilities.
SBOAT takes as input the normal production model
with minimal modifications. The user needs only an-
notate the process with rewards and restraints as illus-
trated in fig. 7. The resulting model is useful in sev-
eral ways. It can be used as a basis for debate about
the current workflow as well as for the current hazard
steps and current precautions installed in the process
to prevent these. Once a point of interest in the pro-
cess is found queries can be constructed to determine
the probabilities of a range of values of the annotated
quantities at that point. Further points and execution
paths can be “discovered” using queries, such as all
paths that lead to a system deadlock.
In this manner the tool is useful in that a debate re-
garding risk management often needs to take the nor-
mal workflow as a basis and weigh efficiency, prob-
ability and risk as well as the impact of a possible
precaution against a risk into consideration before im-
plementation.
Further SBOAT may be used to suggest improved
workflows when a unacceptable risk has been dis-
covered.
6 DISCUSSION
The two tools have specific strengths and weaknesses
which makes each of them suited to various context.
SBM is a useful tool if only hazard situations are of
interest and there is a need to get a quick overview of
the current precautions. SBOAT, however, is useful if
also the normal workflow is of interest and if a more
detailed picture of the workflow quantitative proper-
ties is desired.
Ideally these two tools should be used together
to analyse the same workflow as they complement
each other. They show different aspects of the case.
SafetyBarrierManagerr shows where safety barriers
currently are and can be used to analyse whether these
adequately cover all potential risk situations. SBOAT
can be used to give a complete and detailed overview
of the current workflow, including the normal state.
The output from both tools can help organisations im-
prove not only their risk management process but only
ensure these steps are optimal in terms of the normal
operating state.
We would suggest using the two tools as follows:
1. Draw the current process in
SafetyBarrierManagerr. Include all safety
barriers.
2. Use SafetyBarrierManagerr to analyse the cur-
rent flow and safety barriers. Are these adequate?
3. Formulate desired parameters, for example time
or temperature and constraints, for example that
step A must take place before step B.
Figure 5: Barriers and workflow in a chicken processing plant concerning discovering illness in the chickens being processed.
Figure 7: Quantitative safety analysis of the chicken process.
4. Use SBOAT to draw the current process, using
the input parameters found in step 3. Debate the
output. Is the current normal state as desired?
Could the risk management steps be improved?
5. Discuss and suggest potential desired improve-
ments to the current workflow, within the given
restraints. Use SBOAT to draw up these different
scenarios.
6. Evaluate the potential improved workflows
outputted from SBOAT. Draw these in
SafetyBarrierManagerr to see whether safety
barriers have remained the same, improved or
worsened the risk implications.
7. Decide on a new workflow to use which fulfils
the restraints defined in step 3 and has at least the
same, ideally more or improved, safety barriers
as shown in the SafetyBarrierManagerr tool.
By using SafetyBarrierManagerr and SBOAT to-
gether it is possible to create a workflow which is both
improved according to safety parameters as well as
other desired parameters. The main drawback at the
moment by using both tools in the same workflow is
that the tools use different inputs so that the user need
to input parameters in both tools.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND NOTES FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
This paper investigated two graphical tools for work-
flow improvement which can help reduce errors;
SBOAT (Stochastic BPMN Optimisation and Ana-
lysis Tool) and SBM (Safety Barrier Manager).
While these tools can yield significant safety im-
provements when used on their own it is possible,
when using them on the same case, to produce an
improved workflow both in terms of safety barriers
and in terms of other desired parameters for the given
workflow.
Future research will focus on further testing the ap-
plicability of these two tools on the described case
in further detail. The use of both uses on cases from
other industries is also of interest in order to compare
results across industries.
Furthermore, we would like to investigate the pos-
sibility to combine the tools in one user interface, so
that the user can use each tool separately or together
but only need to use one program. A part of this would
be that the user only need to input all choices and de-
scriptions, including safety barriers, rewards and con-
straints, once.
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